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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-New Mexico Denies Fifth
Amendment Protection to Corporations:
John Doe and Five Unnamed Corporations
v. State ex rel. Governor's Organized
Crime Prevention Commission
I.

INTRODUCTION

In John Doe & Five Unnamed Corps. v. State ex rel. Governor's
Organized Crime Prevention Commission' the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that a corporation does not qualify as a "person" for purposes of
Fifth Amendment immunity under the Organized Crime Act. 2 The court
reached its decision based upon the rules of statutory construction and
interpretation. The decision in this case moves New Mexico case law in
line with the United States Supreme Court's standards, as represented
in Braswell v. United States.3 Under this standard, a corporation cannot
avail itself of a claim of Fifth Amendment immunity. 4 Nor can a corporate
custodian claim Fifth Amendment immunity with regard to the production
of corporate records, no matter how personally incriminating. 5 This note
analyzes the case and explores the implications of the decision.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 25, 1989, the Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission ("Commission") issued an administrative subpoena duces tecum
to John Doe. 6 The Commission requested the production of business
documents from John Doe and Five Corporations of which he was sole
owner and shareholder. The Commission issued the subpoena pursuant
to section 29-9-5(C) of the Organized Crime Act 7 in connection with an
investigation of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into
the pornography business.'
John Doe appeared before the Commission as directed, but refused
to respond to questions or to produce the subpoenaed documents on the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

114 N.M. 78, 835 P.2d 76 (1992).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-1-1 to -15 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
487 U.S. 99 (1988).
Id. at 116.
Id.
John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 78-79, 835 P.2d at 76-77.
Section 29-9-5(C) of the Organized Crime Act states in relevant part:
The [Clommission is authorized to:
(4) ... subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance before the commission and
require them to produce before the commission any books, records, documents or
other evidence relevant or material to an investigation ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9-5(C).
8. John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 79, 835 P.2d at 77.
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grounds that his Fifth Amendment rights would be violated. The Com-

mission initiated proceedings to enforce the subpoenas in the First Judicial
District Court of New Mexico. The court entered an order enforcing the
subpoenas on November 6, 1990. 9 Subsequently, John Doe produced a
small box of documents. The Commission found these documents to be
inadequate and issued more specific subpoenas to John Doe and the Five
Corporations on April 19, 1991.10
John Doe and the Five Corporations filed a petition to quash, modify,
or extend the subpoenas as provided in the Organized Crime Act." The
court quashed the subpoena directed to John Doe. 12 The court upheld
the subpoenas directed to the corporations, however, stating that "the
evidentiary privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, analogous portions of the New Mexico
Constitution, and NMSA 1978, [section] 29-2-9, applies only to 'natural
persons' and does not apply to corporations."' 3 The court ordered John
Doe to produce the 4subpoenaed documents and records for inspection
by the Commission.'
John Doe appealed the trial court's ruling regarding the Five Corporations.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

The court determined that the issue in this case involved "both a
limitation on the investigatory power of the Commission and an investigatory tool that gives the Commission discretionary power to grant
immunity."'

5

Specifically, the court examined whether a corporate entity

was entitled to the right against self incrimination accorded "natural
persons" under the United States and New Mexico Constitutions.

6

If a

corporation had a right against self-incrimination, the Commission would
to the corporation in order to compel
be required to extend immunity
7
the production of evidence.'

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Section 29-9-5(C)(4) of the Organized Crime Act states in relevant part:
At any time before the return date of the subpoena, the person subpoenaed may
file a petition to set aside the subpoena, modify the subpoena, or extend the return
date thereon in district court of any county in which the person is subpoenaed to
appear and the court upon showing of good cause may set aside the subpoena,
modify it or extend the return date of the subpoena ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9-5(C)(4).
12. John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 79, 835 P.2d at 77.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing In re Investigation No. 2 of the Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Comm'n,
93 N.M. 525, 527, 602 P.2d 622, 624 (1979) (referring to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9-9)).
16. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.M. CoNsT. art. II, § 15.
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9-9(A) provides:
If, in the course of any investigation or hearing conducted by the commission
pursuant to the Organized Crime Act [29-9-1 to 29-9-17 NMSA 1978], a person
refuses to answer a question or questions or produce evidence of any kind on the
ground that he will thereby be exposed to criminal prosecution or penalty or
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The legislature did not explicitly define the personal status of a corporation in the Organized Crime Act. Because the definition of "person"
may include corporations, the status of corporations under section 299-9(A) of the Organized Crime Act 8 is not clear.' 9 To clarify this ambiguity, the court examined the Organized Crime Act using the rules of
statutory construction and interpretation in order to determine whether
be considered "persons" for
the legislature intended that corporations
20
purpose of the Organized Crime Act.
The court used three interpretative schemes to determine the intent of
the legislature in establishing the Organized Crime Act. First, the court
examined the statute to determine that the intended purpose of the
Organized Crime Act would be impaired by a grant of immunity to
corporations. 2' Second, the court looked to United States Supreme Court
rulings denying personal status and immunity to corporations. 22 The court
"presumed that the legislature knew about the existing law and did not
intend to enact a law inconsistent with any existing law."123 Finally, the
court looked to the Racketeering Act, 24 enacted after the Organized Crime
Act, to determine that the legislature was aware of its option to define
a corporation as a person, but had chosen not to do so. 25
A.

Purpose of the Organized Crime Act
A corporation may be accorded the same status as a natural person
under the law in some instances. 26 The appellant asserted that the Five
Corporations were entitled to the Fifth Amendment protection accorded
to a natural person. 27 The court proceeded to use rules of statutory
construction and interpretation to determine whether the legislature in-

forfeiture, the commission may order the person to answer the question or questions
or produce the requested evidence and confer immunity as provided in this section.
A person receiving a grant of immunity from the Commission "shall be immune from having
such responsive answer given by him or such responsive evidence produced by him, or evidence
derived therefrom used to expose him to criminal prosecution or penalty of forfeiture .... Id.

§ 29-9-9(B).

18. Id. § 29-9-9(A) (dealing with immunity from criminal prosecution).
19. "There is ambiguity in Subsection 29-9-9(A) because 'person' may be extended to include
a corporation." John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 80, 835 P.2d at 78.
20. Id. at 79-81, 835 P.2d at 77-79. In making this determination the court quoted Methola v.
County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 333, 622 P.2d 234, 238 (1980): "Where there is ambiguity in
statutory language and the meaning is not clear, the courts must resort to construction and
interpretation. Any time rules of construction are applied, the overriding concern of the Court is
to determine legislative intent." Id. at 79-80, 835 P.2d at 77-78 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 80, 835 P.2d at 78.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Quintana v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 100 N.M. 224, 227, 668 P.2d
1101, 1104 (1983)).
24. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
25. John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 81, 835 P.2d at 79.
26. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-3(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). The New Mexico legislature has
defined person to include corporations for the purpose of the Racketeering Act.
27. John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 79, 835 P.2d at 77.
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tended that a corporation should
be defined as a person for purposes
28
of the Organized Crime Act.
The court first looked to the Organized Crime Act to determine the
intent of the legislature in its creation of the Commission. The purpose
of the Commission, as defined by the legislature, "is to forestall, check
and prevent the infiltration and encroachment of organized crime into
public and private affairs within New Mexico .... -29 In order to accomplish this purpose the Commission may disseminate "testimony and
other evidence . . . to law enforcement agencies ...
as [it deems]
proper .... "30
If the Commission deems it proper, this could include the dissemination
of evidence to be used in the prosecution of those involved in organized
crime. The ability to provide evidence to law enforcement agencies leading
to indictments for organized crime-related offenses logically furthers the
purpose of the Commission to "forestall, check and prevent the infiltration
and encroachment of organized crime" into New Mexico."
If corporations were accorded Fifth Amendment protection under the
Organized Crime Act, the Commission would be forced to provide immunity in order to compel the production of incriminating evidence from
a corporation, or forego access to the evidence completely. Either option
would limit the power of the Commission in carrying out its legislatively
mandated purpose.
In interpreting the intent of the legislature, the court stated that "remedial legislation generally is liberally construed to facilitate and accomplish the intent and purpose .... ,,32 The court further stated that
"[a]llowing a corporation through its representatives to refuse to produce
documents ... would impede the Commission's power, contrary to the
purpose of the [Organized Crime] Act." 3
B.

Related United States Supreme Court Decisions
In a further effort to determine the intent of the legislature, the court
looked at the historical background in which the Organized Crime Act
was promulgated. 3 4 In particular, the court looked to the United States

28. Id.
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. at § 29-9-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
30. Id. at § 29-9-5(D).
31. Id. at § 29-9-4.
32. John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 80, 835 P.2d at 78. In support of the decision to
construe the provisions of the Organized Crime Act to facilitate and accomplish the intent and
purpose of the legislature in its passage, the court cited Stratton v. Gurley Motor Co., 105 N.M.
803, 808, 737 P.2d 1180, 1185, cert. denied, 105 N.M. 781, 737 P.2d 893 (1987). For additional
support, the court quoted NoRsmAN J. SINGER, SUTHIRLAND STATUrORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.06 (Temp.
Pamp. 5th ed. 1992): "A statute is strictly construed when its letter is narrowed to exclude matters
which if included would defeat the policy of the legislation and produce results which do not
conform to its purpose." John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 80, 835 P.2d at 78.
33. John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. 80, 835 P.2d at 78.
34. Id. The court stated that "[i]t is appropriate to look to the history and background of the
Act when determining legislative intent." Id. (citing Monroe v. Wall, 66 N.M. 15, 18, 340 P.2d
1069, 1070 (1959)). Furthermore, the court held that "[t]he statute must be interpreted as the
legislature understood it at the time it was passed." Id. (citing Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 82 N.M. 193, 196, 477 P.2d 827, 830 (1970)).
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Supreme Court's interpretations that also restricted claims of Fifth Amendment protection by corporations.
The court first cited Hale v. Henkel, 35 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a corporation's records are not entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection.3 6 In Hale, the custodian of the corporate records
refused to provide subpoenaed records in conjunction with a Sherman
Act 37 investigation. The Sherman Act contains an immunity provision38
similar to the immunity provision of the Organized Crime Act. 39 The
custodian of the corporate records was accorded immunity under the
statute, but the Court refused to extend the immunity to the corporation.4
The Hale Court based this decision on the personal nature of Fifth
Amendment immunity, preventing a person from invoking immunity to
protect a third party. 4' The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded its
analysis of Hale by summarizing the United States Supreme Court's
decision on the issue of corporate immunity as follows: "Just as a person
cannot assert the privilege on behalf of a third person, a corporate officer
cannot assert the privilege on behalf of a corporation." 42 In subsequent
cases, this concept has been expanded to disallow the claim of personal
immunity by the natural person serving as the custodian of corporate
records.43 It has also been extended to other collective entities which are

35. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).

36. The Court in Hale stated:
[A] corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for
the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and
holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. Its
powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter.
Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the
laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its
contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange
anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain
franchises, could not in the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises
had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production
of the corporate books and papers for that purpose.
Id.at 74-75.
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 7 (1973).
38. The John Doe & Five Corps. court quoted the Sherman Act immunity provision from Hale
as follows: "[N]o person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or
on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said acts." John Doe &
Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 80, 835 P.2d at 78 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906)).
39. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9-9.
40. Hale, 201 U.S. at 69-70.
41. The Hale Court stated:
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself
is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never intended to permit him
to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony,
even though he were the agent of such person.
Id.
42. John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 80, 835 P.2d at 78 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 69-70 (1906)).
43. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The Court reasoned that if the custodian
were allowed to defeat a subpoena directed at the corporation by way of claim of his own Fifth
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not incorporated, such as unions and partnerships. 44 Furthermore, the

that the size of the corporation
United States Supreme Court has held
45

does not alter the lack of privilege.
The John Doe & Five Corps. court then looked to Braswell v. United
States for additional insight into the historical background of the Or-

ganized Crime Act .46 The facts in Braswell are similar to those in the
John Doe & Five Corps. case. In both cases, the natural person appellant
was sole shareholder in the corporations whose records were subpoenaed.
Braswell came in the wake of two other United States Supreme Court

cases, Fisher v. United States47 and United States v. Doe,4 in which the

act of production immunity was established. Act of production immunity
is grounded in the concept that the production of corporate records have
49
a testimonial aspect independent of the contents of the records. The
natural person appellant in Braswell asserted that he was entitled to
production immunity if he produced the subpoenaed records.5 0 The Bra-

swell Court disagreed, quoting United States v. White51 for the proposition
that a custodian assumes "the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial

entity or association of which they are agents or officers and they are
production of the papers might
bound by its obligations ... even though
52
personally."
them
incriminate
to
tend
The Braswell Court recognized that the production of corporate records
does have a testimonial aspect." A total grant of immunity from prosecution would, however, have serious consequences "if the Government
-114 The Court prohas any thought of prosecuting the custodian ....
that the custodian
event
in
the
which,
by
process
a
develop
to
ceeded
is prosecuted for offenses arising from the act of production, the fact
that he produced the documents would be withheld from the jury." The

Amendment privilege, then access to corporate records would effectively be denied. "[T]he custodian
has no .privilege to refuse production [of the records] although their contents tend to incriminate
him." Id. at 382.
44. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
45. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (involving a law firm partnership consisting
of three persons). The Court stated that "[ilt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by
the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be." Id. at 100.
46. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988). For a more in-depth analysis of this
case, see Scott D. Price, Note, Braswell v. United States: An Examination of a Custodian'sFifth
Amendment Right to Avoid PersonalProduction of CorporateRecords, 34 ViL. L. REv. 353 (1989),
and Timothy W. Barbow, Note, Braswell v. United States: Using the Corporate Fiction to Deny
an Individual his Fifth Amendment Rights, 12 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 405 (1990).
47. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
48. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
49. "Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers ... their
possession or control by the [custodian, and] . . . would indicate the [custodian's] belief that the
papers are those described in the subpoena." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
50. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
51. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
52. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 110-11 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 669 (1944)).
53. Id. at 111.
54. Id. at 117.
55. Id. at 118.

Spring 1993]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Court reasoned that while the jury was free to assign the act of production
to the custodian, it might also reasonably assign the act to another
individual, thus protecting5 6 the custodian from the incriminating nature
of the act of production.
Finally, as cited in a footnote by the New Mexico Supreme Court,
the Braswell Court proposed a possible exception.5 7 Where the custodian
is the sole employee and officer of the corporation, and the jury would
inevitably conclude he produced the record, immunity for the act of
production may apply.58 This scenario was not raised in either case, so
the outcome of such a situation is still in question.

C. The Racketeering Act
For additional support for the proposition that the legislature purposely
withheld Fifth Amendment protection to corporations under the Organized
Crime Act, the John Doe & Five Corps. court looked to the establishment
of the Racketeering Act in 1989.19 In the Racketeering Act, corporations
are defined as persons. 0 The court reasoned that "[k]nowing that the
definition of 'persons' was extended to corporations in the Racketeering
Act, the legislature could have enacted an immunity section in that Act
or amended Section 29-9-9 to include immunity to corporations." ' 6' The
court concluded by stating that the legislature did not define corporations
Crime Act, and that the court was "powerless
as persons in the Organized
' 62
to do that for them.
The John Doe & Five Corps. court held that "the evidentiary privilege
against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, New Mexico Constitution article XI [sic], [section] 15, and
NMSA 1978, Section 29-9-9, does not apply to appellant corporations
or John Doe in his representative capacity.''63 The court concluded by
affirming "the district court's Final Order Denying Petition to Quash,
Modify or Extend Subpoenas issued on July 9, 1991."'
V. IMPLICATIONS
65
In light of the supreme court's reliance on Braswell v. United States,
the decision in John Doe & Five Corps. would seem to negate any claim
of Fifth Amendment immunity for the production of corporate records.
A custodian of corporate records accepts the position along with the
rights and duties of the corporation.6 6 This includes a waiver of Fifth

56.
57.
States,
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 81 n.1, 835 P.2d at 79 n.1 (citing Braswell v. United
487 U.S. 99, 118 n.11 (1988)).
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 n.11.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-1 to -6 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
Id. § 30-42-3(B).
John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 81, 835 P.2d at 79.
Id.
Id.
Id.
487 U.S. 99 (1988).
Id. at 110-11.
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Amendment immunity regarding the production of corporate records,
regardless of how personally incriminating they might be.
Attorneys, when advising clients of the benefits and duties of incorporation, should also advise clients of the collateral loss of Fifth Amendment privilege by the custodian of the corporate records. This is especially
important when the custodian is also the sole owner and shareholder of
the corporation. In this instance, the production and contents of the
records can only be attributed to the custodian. If the records are
personally incriminating the custodian will have no access to Fifth Amendment immunity if the records are subpoenaed under the Organized Crime
Act and similar statutes.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In John Doe & Five Unnamed Corps. v. New Mexico ex rel. Governor's
Organized Crime Prevention Commission, the New Mexico Supreme Court
has clarified the Fifth Amendment status of corporations for purposes
of the Organized Crime Act. Corporations, as "creature[s] of the State," 67
are limited to the rights and duties defined by the State. Unless expressly
defined as "persons" by the legislature, the New Mexico Supreme Court
has determined that corporations do not have access to Fifth Amendment
immunity. 8 The court found that to determine otherwise would impair
the power 9of the Organized Crime Act contrary to the intent of the
6
legislature.
By extension, the natural person serving as the custodian of the corporate records cannot claim Fifth Amendment immunity with regard to
the production of the subpoenaed corporate records. 70 In accepting the
duties of the custodian of the corporate records, the custodian also accepts
the same "rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity . . .-.
These duties include the production of subpoenaed corporate records
production
without access to Fifth Amendment immunity, "even though
' 72
of the papers might tend to incriminate [him] personally."
TRACY TOULOU

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Hale, 201 U.S. at 74.
John Doe & Five Corps., 114 N.M. at 81, 835 P.2d at 79.
Id.
Id.
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 110 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. at 669).
Id. at 110-11.

